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Polimetrics (third term 2018/19)
Course aims and objectives
This course is aimed to teach you how to apply the spatial theory of voting in different settings to better understand the entire political cycle: from electoral competition to government formation. Then you also will learn the main theories and the connected methods available in the literature to estimate the policy space within which the political competition occurs as well as to measure the positions of political actors interacting in such space. To this aim, different open-source software will be also employed during the classes.
Course prerequisites
The mathematical requirements for the class are minimal. Only a decent knowledge of algebra is assumed, as well as familiarity with the basic concepts of descriptive statistics and comparative politics.
Required readings (for students not enrolled in the course)
You can download the file with the all the texts of the course here (to open this file, please use the data compressione tool WinRAR)
Lectures (first half of the course)
First theme (Monday, April 8, Room 3) What we mean by preferences of political actors
Required reading:
Laver M. and W.B. Hunt, 1990. Policy and Party Competition, Routledge, Introduction and Chapter 1
Second theme - first part (Monday, April 15, Room 3) The spatial-voting model
Required reading:
Adams J., Merrill, S. and R. Zur, 2019. The Spatial-Voting Model, chapter published in “SAGE Handbook of Research Methods is Political Science & International Relations” (Eds: Luigi Curini an Robert J. Franzese), London: Sage, 2019
Second theme - second part (Tuesday, April 16, Room 3) The spatial-voting model: some extensions
Required reading:
Adams J., Merrill, S. and R. Zur, 2019. The Spatial-Voting Model, chapter published in “SAGE Handbook of Research Methods is Political Science & International Relations” (Eds: Luigi Curini an Robert J. Franzese), London: Sage, 2019
Third theme (Monday, April 29, Room 3) The core-party theory
Required reading:
Schofield N. 1995. Coalition Politics. A formal model and empirical analysis, Journal of Theoretical Political 7(3): 245-281
Suggested reading:
Schofield N. 1993. Political competition and multiparty coalition governments, European Journal of Political Research, 23, 1-33
Lab (Tuesday, April 30, Room 2) a) Introduction to Cybersenate; b) An application [software required: Cybersenate; dataset 1 (Letta); dataset 2 (Renzi)]
Fourth theme (Monday, May 6, Room 3) The porfolio theory
Required reading:
Laver M., and K.A. Shepsle, 1996. Making and Breaking Governments, Cambridge University Press, Chapters 2, 3 and 4
Suggested reading:
Laver M., K.A. Shepsle 1990. Coalitions and Cabinet Government, American Political Science Review, 84(3), 873-890
Lab (Tuesday, May 7, Room 2) An application [software required: Winset ; Winset manual; dataset 1 (Letta); dataset 2 (Renzi)]
Fifth theme (Monday, May 13, Room 3) Veto Player Theory
Required reading:
Tsebelis, G. 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, Princeton University Press, Introduction and Chapter 1
Suggested reading:
Tsebelis G. 1995. Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartisism, British Journal of Political Science, 25(3), 289-325
Lab (Tuesday, May 14, Room 2) An application [software required: Cybersenate; dataset 1 (Letta)]; Summary Exercises
Examination first half of the course
Thursday 23 May, Room 2 5:30 PM
For the second half of Polimetrics, please visit the page of Andrea Ceron at the following link
This course is aimed to teach you how to apply the spatial theory of voting in different settings to better understand the entire political cycle: from electoral competition to government formation. Then you also will learn the main theories and the connected methods available in the literature to estimate the policy space within which the political competition occurs as well as to measure the positions of political actors interacting in such space. To this aim, different open-source software will be also employed during the classes.
Course prerequisites
The mathematical requirements for the class are minimal. Only a decent knowledge of algebra is assumed, as well as familiarity with the basic concepts of descriptive statistics and comparative politics.
Required readings (for students not enrolled in the course)
You can download the file with the all the texts of the course here (to open this file, please use the data compressione tool WinRAR)
Lectures (first half of the course)
First theme (Monday, April 8, Room 3) What we mean by preferences of political actors
Required reading:
Laver M. and W.B. Hunt, 1990. Policy and Party Competition, Routledge, Introduction and Chapter 1
Second theme - first part (Monday, April 15, Room 3) The spatial-voting model
Required reading:
Adams J., Merrill, S. and R. Zur, 2019. The Spatial-Voting Model, chapter published in “SAGE Handbook of Research Methods is Political Science & International Relations” (Eds: Luigi Curini an Robert J. Franzese), London: Sage, 2019
Second theme - second part (Tuesday, April 16, Room 3) The spatial-voting model: some extensions
Required reading:
Adams J., Merrill, S. and R. Zur, 2019. The Spatial-Voting Model, chapter published in “SAGE Handbook of Research Methods is Political Science & International Relations” (Eds: Luigi Curini an Robert J. Franzese), London: Sage, 2019
Third theme (Monday, April 29, Room 3) The core-party theory
Required reading:
Schofield N. 1995. Coalition Politics. A formal model and empirical analysis, Journal of Theoretical Political 7(3): 245-281
Suggested reading:
Schofield N. 1993. Political competition and multiparty coalition governments, European Journal of Political Research, 23, 1-33
Lab (Tuesday, April 30, Room 2) a) Introduction to Cybersenate; b) An application [software required: Cybersenate; dataset 1 (Letta); dataset 2 (Renzi)]
Fourth theme (Monday, May 6, Room 3) The porfolio theory
Required reading:
Laver M., and K.A. Shepsle, 1996. Making and Breaking Governments, Cambridge University Press, Chapters 2, 3 and 4
Suggested reading:
Laver M., K.A. Shepsle 1990. Coalitions and Cabinet Government, American Political Science Review, 84(3), 873-890
Lab (Tuesday, May 7, Room 2) An application [software required: Winset ; Winset manual; dataset 1 (Letta); dataset 2 (Renzi)]
Fifth theme (Monday, May 13, Room 3) Veto Player Theory
Required reading:
Tsebelis, G. 2002. Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work, Princeton University Press, Introduction and Chapter 1
Suggested reading:
Tsebelis G. 1995. Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartisism, British Journal of Political Science, 25(3), 289-325
Lab (Tuesday, May 14, Room 2) An application [software required: Cybersenate; dataset 1 (Letta)]; Summary Exercises
Examination first half of the course
Thursday 23 May, Room 2 5:30 PM
For the second half of Polimetrics, please visit the page of Andrea Ceron at the following link