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Thinking strategically: conflict and cooperation (third term 2015/16)
Learning objectives
This course teaches some of the tools (mainly from game theory and collective action literature) available for understanding and analysing a host of social and political problems. In particular, we will offer some answers to a simple but crucial question: how to solve problems of collective action and cooperation within loosely institutionalized contexts? Or, in other words, how, when and under which conditions self-governance is possible? The aim is to show that cooperation among a group of individuals, under given circumstances, is a feasible outcome. We will then discuss the relevance of our findings when it comes to think, selecting and crafting specific development policies.
Course content
Political theory often assumes that individuals are unable to pre-commit themselves in a credible way whenever the ex-post temptation to defect from an agreement is sufficiently large, unless a third part has the power to externally enforce that agreement. The now extended literature on collective action problems deals precisely with these aspects. Collective action problems are indeed ubiquities: from international relations to daily interactions, social actors are usually called to choose between cooperation and conflict. The usual solution for handling collective action problems involves imposing a governmental mechanism. Typically this means a top-down solution, regardless of its fit to the specific problem. In this course we will show that this can be an ill-conceived public policy solution and that institutional arrangements that stimulates cooperation, under given circumstances, often craft much better mechanisms to resolve collective action dilemmas.
Required readings
Lichbach M.I., The Cooperator’s Dilemma, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1996.
Ostrom E., Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
First theme: The Dilemma of Cooperation
Second theme: The Community solution
Third theme: The Market solution
Fourth theme: The Hiearchy solution
Fifth theme: The Contract solution
This course teaches some of the tools (mainly from game theory and collective action literature) available for understanding and analysing a host of social and political problems. In particular, we will offer some answers to a simple but crucial question: how to solve problems of collective action and cooperation within loosely institutionalized contexts? Or, in other words, how, when and under which conditions self-governance is possible? The aim is to show that cooperation among a group of individuals, under given circumstances, is a feasible outcome. We will then discuss the relevance of our findings when it comes to think, selecting and crafting specific development policies.
Course content
Political theory often assumes that individuals are unable to pre-commit themselves in a credible way whenever the ex-post temptation to defect from an agreement is sufficiently large, unless a third part has the power to externally enforce that agreement. The now extended literature on collective action problems deals precisely with these aspects. Collective action problems are indeed ubiquities: from international relations to daily interactions, social actors are usually called to choose between cooperation and conflict. The usual solution for handling collective action problems involves imposing a governmental mechanism. Typically this means a top-down solution, regardless of its fit to the specific problem. In this course we will show that this can be an ill-conceived public policy solution and that institutional arrangements that stimulates cooperation, under given circumstances, often craft much better mechanisms to resolve collective action dilemmas.
Required readings
Lichbach M.I., The Cooperator’s Dilemma, Ann Arbor, The University of Michigan Press, 1996.
Ostrom E., Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
First theme: The Dilemma of Cooperation
Second theme: The Community solution
Third theme: The Market solution
Fourth theme: The Hiearchy solution
Fifth theme: The Contract solution